

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1775

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0471

EXDIS

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS OF
OCTOBER 4, 1976

1. ON OCTOBER 4, US REP AND DEPREP MET WITH SOVIET REPS
TARASOV AND SHUSTOV AT SOVIET INVITATION.
2. TARASOV SAID SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONTINUED INTERESTED IN AN
AGREEMENT AND IN MAKING PROGRESS IN VIENNA. US REP SAID HE HAD
HEARD SOVIET LEADERS INTENDED TO GIVE INCREASED EMPHASIS TO THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASKED TARASOV WHAT STEPS THE
SOVIETS HAD PLANNED IN ORDER TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO THIS
DESIRE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. TARASOV INDICATED SOVIETS
CONSIDERED THEY HAD MADE RECENT MOVES IN VIENNA AND THAT IT
WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TO MOVE. TARASOV INDICATED EAST WOULD
NOT PRESS FOR WESTERN DATA. US REP SAID THAT MAIN STEPS SOVIETS
COULD TAKE WOULD BE TO GIVE A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 16. EASTERN FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL COULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THIS WESTERN PRO-
POSAL. SECOND, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF
COUNTING RULES. OWING TO CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, IT MIGHT BE

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SOME TIME BEFORE THE WEST WAS IN A POSITION TO TABLE UPDATED

DATA. IT WOULD BE TO ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES TO USE THE INTERVENING TIME FOR DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES.

3. TARASOV SAID THE SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE DECEMBER 16 WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR REASONS THEY HAD STATED. AS REGARDS US REP'S SECOND SUGGESTION, THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES IMMEDIATELY WHEN THE WEST TABLED DATA, BUT HE COULD SAY NOW DEFINITELY THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT READY TO DO SO UNTIL THEN.

4. US REPS SAID THE SOVIETS HAD NOT MADE A CONVINCING CASE THAT THEIR FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A REAL DEPARTURE ON PHASING. THEY HAD NOT MET PRIMARY WESTERN INTERESTS IN PHASING, WHICH WERE PRIOR AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING AND THE PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. THESE CONDITIONS REMAINED. BUT THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE A USEFUL STEP TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE BY DROPPING THEIR INSISTENCE THAT NO-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COMMIT THEMSELVES IN A FIRST AGREEMENT TO NATIONAL CEILINGS, REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND REDUCING THEIR FORCES BY UNITS.

5. TARASOV SAID HE HAD TWO PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TO ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS: PARTICIPANTS COULD TURN TO A DISCUSSION OF THE EARLIER EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A DRAFTING EXERCISE TO SEE IF THEY COULD BLOCK OUT COME COMMON POINTS AND LIST POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT FOR FURTHER WORK.

6. US REP REPLIED THAT THE CONCEPT OF AN INDEPENDENT FREEZE SEPARATE FROM REDUCTIONS WAS NOT A GOOD ONE AS IT WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE A SIGNIFICANT EASTERN MANPOWER DISPARITY: SUCH A PROJECT WAS IMPRACTICAL IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON FIGURES AND WOULD NOT BE BASED, AS WAS THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR NO-INCREASE, ON ACCEPTANCE OF PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER AS AN OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REPS SAID AS CONCERNED TARASOV'S SECOND SUGGESTION, THEY WOULD GIVE IT SOME THOUGHT, BUT AT FIRST SIGHT, IT WOULD NOT APPEAR THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE FAR ENOUGH ADVANCED TO WARRANT COMMON DRAFTING.

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7. TARASOV STRESSED INEQUITY BETWEEN US TAKING REDUCTIONS BY INDIVIDUALS, WHILE THE WEST WAS REQUIRING SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY AS A UNIT. US REP SAID US CONSIDERED THE REQUIREMENT THAT SOVIETS WITHDRAW AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY JUSTIFIED BY THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND BY GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES. TARASOV INDICATED SOVIET CONTINUED TO CONSIDER THIS ISSUE AND THE ISSUE OF A

DEFINITE COMMITMENT ON TIMING AND SIZE OF STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS
BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS PRIMARY SOVIET INTERESTS.

8. COMMENT: THE CONTENT AND STYLE OF REMARKS BY TARASOV AND
SHUSTOV ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD INSIST THAT
NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS ON
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, TO MAKE REDUCTIONS ONLY IN UNITS AND
TO ACCEPT NATIONAL CEILINGS TENDED TO CONFIRM THE VIEW THAT THERE
MAY BE SOME SOVIET FLEXIBILITY HERE AND THAT THE MAIN SOVIET
REQUIREMENT IS A COMMITMENT ON TIMING AND SIZE OF REDUCTIONS.
WE CONSIDER TARASOV'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS COUNTING RULES PRIOR
TO TABLING OF UPDATED WESTERN DATA TO BE CONCLUSIVE. DURING
THE DISCUSSION, TARASOV SHOWED HIMSELF AS WELL INFORMED, AND
ALSO AS MORE BLUNT THAN KHLESTOV.

SINCE THE BODY OF THIS REPORT CONTAINS OPERATIONAL POINTS,
INCLUDING DETAILS OF THE EXCHANGE ON DISCUSSION OF COUNTING
RULES, IT IS BEING SENT BY TELEGRAM. END SUMMARY.

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FROM US REP MBFR

9. TARASOV OPENED SESSION. HE INDICATED THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED
THEY HAD MADE RECENT MOVES IN VIENNA AND IT WAS NOW UP TO THE
WEST. HE SAID IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THREE MAIN PROBLEMS HAD
EMERGED FROM THE RECENT MONTHS OF DISCUSSION IN VIENNA: THE

RELUCTANCE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AS TO THE TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS; THE UNSATISFACTORY WESTERN POSITION AS REGARDS ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, PARTICULARLY BY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS; THE THE INEQUITY OF THE WESTERN DEMAND THAT IN A FIRST AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS REDUCE AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF US SOLDIERS AS INDIVIDUALS. (COMMENT: NEITHER AT THIS POINT OR LATER DID TARASOV RAISE ISSUE OF SOVIET OPPOSITION TO ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS: HE FOCUSED SOLELY ON THE FORM OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS. END COMMENT).

10. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, IN THE LAST ROUND, THE SOVIETS HAD PUT DOWN DATA. THE WEST HAD NOT RESPONDED. THE SOVIETS DID NOT INSIST THAT THE WEST TAKE THIS ACTION NOW. WHEN THE WEST WAS READY TO TABLE DATA, THE EAST WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE DATA OF BOTH SIDES. IF THE WEST WAS NOT READY TO TABLE DATA, THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT PRESS THE WEST TO GIVE THAT DATA NOW. THE SOVIETS ADHERED TO THEIR ORIGINAL VIEWPOINT THAT
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THERE WERE A LOT OF OTHER TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED AND DECIDED FIRST BEFORE DATA.

11. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, IF DATA WERE NOT TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE OUTSET, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO AGREE AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NEXT. WHAT STEPS WAS THE US REP THINKING OF FOR PROGRESS IN THE TALKS? THERE HAD BEEN ARTICLES IN THE WESTERN PRESS THAT NO PROGRESS COULD BE EXPECTED IN VIENNA BEFORE THE US ELECTIONS WERE OVER. SOVIET LEADERS UNDERSTOOD THAT ELECTIONS WERE IMPORTANT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE VIENNA TALKS WERE MULTILATERAL ONES WITH 19 PARTICIPANTS AND WERE IMPORTANT. SOVIET AUTHORITIES HOPED IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO DELAY ALL MOVEMENT UNTIL 1977. EASTERN REPS WANTED TO CONTINUE AN ACTIVE SEARCH TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN THE TALKS. THEY CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO THE VIEW THAT A PRACTICAL OUTCOME WAS QUITE POSSIBLE. PERHAPS ONE SHOULD CONSIDER FIXING OR PUTTING DOWN ON PAPER THOSE POINTS AGREED ON UP TO NOW, AND DEFINING MORE CLEARLY THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT WHERE THE TWO SIDES COULD COME TOGETHER BETTER IN THE FUTURE. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME PRACTICAL PROGRESS IN THE TALKS. EACH SIDE COULD EXPLAIN MANY TIMES THE ELEMENTS OF ITS OWN POSITION WHICH IT FOUND RIGHT. EACH COULD MAKE ITS POSITION EVEN MORE CLEAR THAN THEY WERE NOW. BUT IF PARTICIPANTS ENGAGED IN AN EXERCISE LIKE THIS, THE PROCESS WOULD BE ENDLESS AND NEGOTIATORS WOULD TURN COMPLETELY INTO PARROTS.

12. US REP SAID HE ALSO FELT THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MAKE THE MOST OF THIS ROUND TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS. THE ISSUE NOW WAS WHAT COULD BE DONE IN A PRACTICAL SENSE.

13. US REP CONTINUED THAT, FIRST, IT WAS IMPORTANT THE SOVIET REPS UNDERSTAND THE FEELING OF WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES REGARDING IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WASHINGTON VIEW WAS THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DEC 16 REPRESENTED A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. US AUTHORITIES APPRECIATED WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD DONE IN THEIR FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL, WHERE THE SOVIETS HAD CHANGED TWO ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION, THE SEQUENCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED REDUCTIONS AND THE RECOGNITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. BUT BEYOND THAT, THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE OVERALL SOVIET APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS NOR ANY EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE BASIC REASONS OF
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WHY THE WEST CONSIDERED PHASED NEGOTIATIONS NECESSARY. WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD TO HAVE CERTAIN ASSURANCES BEFORE THEY MADE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON THE TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. THESE ASSURANCES WERE A PRIOR EASTERN COMMITMENT TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AT REDUCED FORCE LEVELS AND PRIOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS THAT GOAL. US AUTHORITIES DID NOT CONSIDER THE FEB 19 PROPOSAL COMMENSURATE WITH WHAT THE WEST HAD DONE ON DEC 16. THUS, THE MOST IMPORTANT THOUGHT THE US REP COULD LEAVE WITH SOVIET REPS WAS THE VIEW OF US AUTHORITIES THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR A COMMENSURATE SOVIET MOVE.

14. US REP SAID AS REGARDS THE SECOND TOPIC RAISED BY SOVIET REP, DATA, WESTERN REPS HAD SAID FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT A BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION OF THE FACTS WAS DESIRABLE TO BRING THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES TOGETHER SINCE THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES WERE DATA-DEPENDENT. THE US RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD DEPARTED FROM THEIR PAST PRACTICE IN TABLING DATA, ALTHOUGH US REPS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN AND EASTERN ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES DIFFERED BY AT LEAST 150,000 MEN. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO FIGURE OUT WHY THE ESTIMATES DIFFERED.

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FROM US REP MBFR

15. US REP SAID THAT WHEN THE EAST HAD TABLED FIGURES, WESTERN REPS HAD THOUGHT THEY COULD RESPOND WITH UPDATED WESTERN FIGURES. THEY HAD ALREADY TOLD THE EAST THAT THERE WAS A LIMITED INCREASE IN WESTERN FIGURES, AND THEY HAD INDICATED THE RANGE OF THE WESTERN ESTIMATES OF AIR MANPOWER BY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LEVELS OF THE TWO PROPOSED COMMON CEILINGS.

16. US REP CONTINUED THAT, AS HE WAS SURE SOVIET REPS WERE AWARE, WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO TABLE UPDATED FIGURES. WESTERN REPS INTENDED TO WORK HARD TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION BUT THE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO TAKE SOME TIME. SOVIET REP HAD JUST REPEATED THE EASTERN POSITION THAT EAST WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DATA AFTER THE WEST TABLED ITS UPDATED FIGURES. BUT WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ENTER ON AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE VIEWS OF EITHER SIDE IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD SAY WHO THEY HAD COUNTED IN COMPILING DATA.

17. US REP SAID THIS SUGGESTION WAS MADE BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES TO USE TIME PRODUCTIVELY THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE WASTED.

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18. US REP SAID TARASOV HAD REFERRED TO THE US ELECTIONS. SO FAR, THERE HAD BEEN BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE VIENNA TALKS AND THEY WERE NOT AN ISSUE IN THE ELECTIONS.

19. TARASOV SAID US REP HAD MADE TWO MAIN POINTS. THE FIRST HAD BEEN THAT WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE DEC 16 PROPOSALS A GOOD BASIS FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS. BUT, AS EASTERN

REPS HAD EMPHASIZED, THESE PROPOSALS WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE AS THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO REPEAT ALL THE REASONS FOR THIS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, BUT IT WAS A FACT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

20. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT CONCERNING US REP'S REMARKS ON DATA AND COUNTING RULES, SOVIET REPS WERE AWARE THAT THE WEST COULD ASK A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE COUNTING BASIS USED BY THE WARSAW PACT. IF THE WEST HAD TABLED ITS FIGURES, THE EAST WOULD HAVE HAD SOME QUESTIONS OF ITS OWN. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AN UNDERSTANDABLE SITUATION. BUT ONE COULD NOT TURN THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO SORT OF A TRIBUNAL ON WARSAW PACT DATA, LETTING THE SOVIETS TABLE DATA AND THEN QUESTIONING THEM. THE SOVIETS COULD CONSIDER SUCH QUESTIONS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY. SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN A FIRM AND RESOLUTE DECISION TO DISCUSS DATA ISSUES ONLY AFTER THE WEST HAD TABLED ITS DATA.

21. TARASOV SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT THE POINT FOR CLARITY: HE HAD AUTHORITY TO DUSS METHODS OF COUNTING AND COUNTING RULES ONL REPEAT ONLY AFTER THE WESTERN SIDE HAD TABLED ITS DATA ON WESTERN FORCES. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NEVER CONSIDERED THE DATA QUESTION AS THE KEY QUESTION OR THE FIRST QUESTION TO BE SOLVED. BUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN INTERESTS, THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY ON A MUTUAL AND BILATERAL BASIS, NOT A UNILATERAL ONE. HE HOPED HE HAD MADE HIMSELF ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: AS SOON AS THE WEST TABLED DATA, THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO DISCUSS IT. BUT NOT BEFORE.

22. US REP SAID HE NONETHELESS WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST THAT TARASOV PASS ALONG THIS SUGGESTION TO HIS AUTHORITIES. IT MIGHT
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BE OF INTEREST TO THEM THAT THE PROCESS OF SETTLING THIS ISSUE COULD TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME AND THE US CONSEQUENTLY CONSIDERED IT IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST TO USE THE INTERVENING TIME USEFULLY. THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAD WESTERN FIGURES ON WESTERN GROUND FORCES. THE UPDATED FIGURES WOULD NOT SHOW A GREAT INCREASE. WESTERN COUNTING RULES WOULD NOT CHANGE. WESTERN REPS HAD ALREADY INDICATED THE RANGE OF THEIR FIGURES ON AIR MANPOWER. THEY HAD USED THE SAME COUNTING RULES FOR AIR MANPOWER, SO THERE SHOULD BE NO PRACTICAL PROBLEM. SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHOULD ALSO TAKE THESE ASPECTS INTO CONSIDERATION.

23. TARASOV SAID THE SOVIETS WANTED WESTERN FIGURES ON THE TABLE. THEN THEY COULD DISCUSS DATA RIGHT AWAY. HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR IN ADDITION TO THE REASONS HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN, THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT TO

DISCUSS SOVIET FIGURES WITHOUT HAVING NEW WESTERN FIGURES. US
REPS COULD CONSIDER THIS A PRESTIGE VIEWPOINT IF THEY WISHED.
BUT IT WAS A FIRMLY HELD ONE.

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

24. USDEP REP SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A FURTHER PRACTICAL
SUGGESTION. IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION AT THE END OF THE
LAST ROUND, US REPS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS
SHOULD DO MORE TO INCREASE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING THE WESTERN EUROPEANS IN THE VIABILITY OF
A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT. US REPS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE A
NUMBER OF PRACTICAL STEPS THAT EASTERN REPS COULD TAKE IN THIS
REGARD. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO RESOLVE THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY
BETWEEN THE EASTERN POSITION THAT IN A FIRST AGREEMENT THE EAST
WANTED ONLY A GENERAL COMMITMENT ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF
REDUCTIONS
FROM THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AND OTHERN EASTERN STATEMENTS THAT
IN A FIRST AGREEMENT ALL PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING THE WESTERN
EUROPEANS, SHOULD SUBSCRIBE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF REDUCING
ARMAMENTS, REDUCTIONS BY UNITS AND INVIDIDUAL NATIONA
CEILINGS. IT WOULD INCREASE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WESTERN
EUROPEANS IF EASTERN REPS CLARIFIED THAT THEY WERE NOT ASKING
WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A FIRST AGREEMENT
TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN ADVANCE TO REDUCE ALL ARMAMENTS IN A

SECOND AGREEMENT, TO REDUCE BY UNITS OR TO ACCEPT NATIONAL CEILINGS. US DEPREP SAID HE THOUGHT THAT EASTERN REPS SHOULD ALSO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ACCEPTING THE CONCEPT OF PARITY
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IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THIRD, AS CONCERNS US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE AN ADVANCE IF EASTERN REPS RECOGNIZED THAT THE REDUCTION OF ALL ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA WAS AN IMPRACTICAL AND UNOBTAINABLE OBJECTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF WESTERN REPS WERE TO FOLLOW THE EASTERN APPROACH IN THIS MATTER IN A FIRST AGREEMENT, US FORCES WOULD BE ACCEPTING A CONTRACTUALIZED SUPERIORITY IN SOVIET FORCES NOT ONLY IN MANPOWER BUT, IN NEARLY ALL MAJOR ARMAMENTS. THIS WAS NOT FEASIBLE. IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE PRACTICAL TO FOCUS ON CERTAIN SELECTED ARMAMENTS OF THE KIND THE WEST HAD PROPOSED.

25. TARSAOV SAID, ON THE CONFIDENCE ISSUE, THE SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT, IF SOVIET AND US FORCES WERE REDUCED BY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE FOR EACH, OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT ADOPT A DIFFERENT APPROACH. OTHER APPROACHES MIGHT BE DISCRIMINATORY. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIET POSITON ON THE ISSUE OF COMMITMENTS FROM NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT CLEAR AND IF THESE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A CERTAIN VOLUME AND SCOPE, THEN THEY SHOULD SAY SO AND IT SHOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE SPECIFICS.

26. US DEPREP SAID THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE WAS KNOWN. AS US REP HAD ALREADY SAID, THE WEST WANTED PRIOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE FORCES TO A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING AND PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. BUT IF SOVIET REPS WERE INTERESTED AS THEY SAID IN PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH COULD INCREASE CONFIDENCE, THEY COULD DO SO BY CLARIFYING INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR OWN POSITION AND DROPPING THESE EXCESSIVE AND BURDENSOME REQUIREMENTS ON THE WESTERN EUROPEANS.

27. TARASOV SAID, WHATEVER COMMITMENTS THE WESTERN EUROPEANS MIGHT UNDERTAKE IN A FIRST AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO IMPLEMENT THESE COMMITMENTS ONLY AFTER REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES HAD TAKEN PLACE. THESE PRIOR REDUCTIONS WOULD CREATE THE CONFIDENCE FOR REDUCTIONS BY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS. NATURALLY, THESE COUNTRIES WOULD BE RELIEVED OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE IF THE US AND SOVIET UNION HAD FAILED TO CARRY OUT TO THE LETTER THEIR OBLIGATIONS FOR PRIOR REDUCTIONS.

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28. SHUSTOV SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS USEFUL TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM OF THE COMMITMENTS BY THE OTHER COUNTRIES THERE WERE TWO ISSUES HERE: THE TIMING AND THE GENERAL SCOPE. THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT FOR A SPECIFIC TIMING WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. THE COMMITMENTS THE WEST HAD PROPOSED DID NOT CONTAIN THIS ELEMENT AT ALL. SOVIET REPS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO TELL THEIR AUTHORITIES WHEN THE OTHER WESTERN APRTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. SECOND, AS REGARDED SCOPE, THE SOVIETS WANTED TO KNOW HOW MUCH THE OTHERS WOULD REDUCE. THE EASTERN APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE WAS THAT EACH PARTICIPANT SHOULD DEMONSTRATE ITS WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE ITS FORCES BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE. THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION WAS THAT EACH PARTICIPANT SHOULD REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING. BUT, IN ANY EVENT, THE GENERAL SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND AGREEMENT SHOULD BE INDICATED IN SOME WAY. THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT A FIRST AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN COMMITMENTS ON TIMING AND THE GENERAL SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND AGREEMENT. THE SPECIFIC FORMULATION OF THESE COMMITMENTS WAS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION.

29. US DEPREP SAID THIS WAS NOT A PROPER DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE. EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN AMBIGUOUS ABOUT THEIR OWN FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL. THEY CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT THEIR FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL HAD DEPARTED FROM THEIR EARLIER POSITION BUT THEIR OWN COMMENTARY ON THEIR FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL INDICATED THEY HAD NOT DONE SO. IT WAS UP TO THE EAST TO CLARIFY THESE INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR OWN POSITION IF THEY WANTED IT TO BE BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION.

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FROM US REP MBFR

30. TARASOV SAID, IF CONFIDENCE CONTINUED TO BE A PROBLEM, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING, IN THE FORMULATION OF AN AGREEMENT, TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSLY DEPENDENT ON PRIOR FULFILLMENT OF WHATEVER TERMS WERE AGREED FOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE IT UNMISTAKABLE THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD NOT BE BOUND IF THESE PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS WERE NOT FAITHFULLY CARRIED OUT.

31. SHUSTOV SAID WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND FOR A FIRST AGREEMENT WAS A DETAILED SERIES OF US AND SOVIET COMMITMENTS AND ONLY A GENERAL OBLIGATION FOR THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD SAID HOW THEY VISUALIZED THIS GENERAL OBLIGATION. WESTERN REPS MIGHT HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS. IF SO, THEY SHOULD STATE THEM. THE MAIN SOVIET REQUIREMENT WAS THAT A GENERAL OBLIGATION SHOULD PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FOR THE SOVIETS THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND PHASE.

32. US REP SAID TARASOV'S REMARKS ON CONFIDENCE WHOLLY OVERLOOKED THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY WESTERN COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE AREA
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WHO WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT A LIMITATION ALBEIT A COLLECTIVE ONE ON SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THEIR FORCES, WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HAVE ANY LIMITATION ON THEIR FORCES IN THEIR NEARBY HOMELAND.

33. TARASOV SAID, AFTER ALL, GERMAN FORCES WERE LIMITED BY THE WEU AGREEMENTS. US REP SAID THIS WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER AMONG THE WESTERN ALLIES. IT WAS QUITE A DIFFERENT MATTER TO UNDERTAKE AN EAST-WEST COMMITMENT ON SUCH A SUBJECT.

34. US REP SAID THE WESTERN ALLIES REALIZED THAT THEY COULD NOT CHANGE GEOGRAPHY AND THEY WERE NONETHELESS WILLING TO COMPLETE AN AGREEMENT COVERING SUBSTANTIALLY ALL THEIR GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER. BUT THEY WERE WILLING TO DO THIS -- AND HERE THE US GAVE THEM FULL SUPPORT -- ONLY ON THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING AND PRIOR REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY.

35. SHUSTOV ASKED WHAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WILLING TO DO AS REGARDS TIMING IF THE SOVIETS WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE DROPPING ANY REQUIREMENT ON THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS AND THE OTHER POINTS RAISED BY US DEPREP. US DEPREP SAID HE HAD MERELY PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIETS CLARIFY AMBIGUITIES IN THEIR OWN FEB 19 PROPOSAL. HE HAD ALSO POINTED OUT WHAT THE WESTERN CONDITIONS WERE FOR SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS.

36. SHUSTOV REFERRED TO THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. HE QUESTIONED HOW IMPORTANT THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF THE TWO US DELIVERY SYSTEMS WAS IF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS COULD AT WILL INCREASE THEIR HOLDINGS OF THESE TYPES OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

37. TARASOV RAISED THE SAME ISSUE AS TO NUCLEAR WARHEADS. SHUSTOV POINTED OUT THAT DUE TO NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY CONSTRAINTS, THE PROBLEM WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT AS TO WARHEADS.

38. US REPS POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE WEST EUROPEANS TO ACCEPT ANY REDUCTION OF OR LIMIT ON, THEIR ARMAMENTS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN THE USSR WOULD NOT BE LIMITED AND THAT THESE ARMAMENTS HAD RECENTLY INCREASED. IT WOULD IN THIS CONTEXT BE ASKING FOR AN UNACCEPTABLE
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EASTERN ADVANTAGE TO EXPECT WESTERN EUROPEANS TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ARMAMENTS.

39. SHUSTOV SAID THE EASTERN EUROPEANS WERE WILLING TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THEIR ARMAMENTS. US REP SAID THE WEST HAD NOT ASKED FOR THIS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. TARASOV SAID THE UK AND FRANCE WOULD ALSO NOT BE LIMITED AS REGARDS FORCES ON THEIR TERRITORY. US REP SAID THAT, AS REGARDS ACTIVE DUTY FORCES WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN A CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF ITS OUTBREAK, THE USSR HAD FAR MORE FORCES AVAILABLE THEN OTHER ADJOINING WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE WEST WAS NOT ASKING THE EAST TO SUBSCRIBE EXPLICITLY TO THE THESIS OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES, BUT MERELY TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THESE UNCHANGEABLE FACTORS.

40. TARASOV SAID THERE SHOULD BE A REAL SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE WAYS FOR ACTION. IF THE WEST TABLED FIGURES, PARTICIPANTS COULD ENGAGE IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE COUNTING METHODS. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, HOWEVER, NO DATA WERE EXPECTED TO BE TABLED FOR A PERIOD OF A MONTH OR TWO, AND PARTICIPANTS WOULD DURING THAT TIME ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF GENERAL QUESTIONS. THE QUESTION ARISING FROM THIS WAS HOW SHOULD PARTICIPANTS MAKE THE MOST PRODUCTIVE USE OF THESE MONTHS?

IF PARTICIPANTS WERE TO ENGAGE IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DEC 16 AND THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEB 19, THEY WOULD MERELY REPEAT THEMSELVES ENDLESSLY. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO FIND MORE PRODUCTIVE WORK. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO USE THIS PERIOD TO SPECIFY THOSE ISSUES WHERE SOME DEGREE OF AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED AND THOSE WHICH WERE POINTS OF DIFFICULTY AND TO THEN TRY TO MOVE THE LATTER FURTHER.

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41. TARASOV SAID HE DID NOT HAVE IN IND AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT DRAFTED IN THE FORM OF AGREED TREATY LANGUAGE, BUT THE DRAFT TEXT OF WORKING PAPERS CONTAINING SOME AGREED PRINCIPLES OR OUTLINES OF AGREED POINTS. IF THIS EXERCISE PROVED SUCCESSFUL, PERHAPS AT THE END OF THE ROUND, PARTICIPANTS COULD MAKE A JOIT PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE THAT THE SIDES HAD DEVELOPED SOME WORKING PAPERS AND THAT WORK ON THEM WAS PROCEEDING.

42. TARASOV SAID, AS A SECOND PROPOSAL FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE ROUND, HE WISHED TO RETURN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST THIS PROPOSAL IN THE PAST HAD BEEN BASED ON THE FACT THAT NO EASTERN FIGURES WERE AVAILABLE. NOW SUCH FIGURES WERE AVAILABLE. IT ALSO SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT SOME WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ENTER ON

DISCUSSION OF THIS MEASURE AGAIN. FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD SAID IN AN INTERVIEW WITH CORRESPONDENTS THAT WEST GERMANY WOULD NOT INCREASE ITS FORCES IRRESPECTIVE OF REDUCTIONS BY OTHER ALLIES. WAS THIS A CHANGE OF POSITION? US DEPREP SAID HE HAD ALREADY TOLD SHUSTOV THAT THIS WAS A STATEMENT MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTRA-ALLIANCE RELATIONS. IT DID NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN THE FRG POSITION CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF REACHING

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AN AGREED COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING IN AN EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON FORCE LEVELS.

43. US REPS SAID, AS REGARDS THE SOVIET FREEZE PROPOSAL, WESTERN REPS HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR THEIR CONTINUED VIEW THAT THE WEST CONSIDERED THAT THE EAST HAD A LARGE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SUPERIORITY. THE WEST WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO CONTRACTUALIZE THIS SUPERIORITY IN A NO-INCREASE AGREEMENT. TARASOV HAD NOT MENTIONED THE WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE SUCH A SUPERIORITY. MOREOVER, A NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL WAS A HIGHLY UNCERTAIN ENTERPRISE AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT FIGURES.

44. US REPS SAID THAT THEY WOULD GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO TARASOV'S PROPOSALS TO TRY SOME COMMON DRAFTING, BUT, AS A PERSONAL OBSERVATION, THEY TENDED TO DOUBT THAT A DEGREE OF GENERAL AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT PRODUCTIVE.

45. TARASOV ASKED WHETHER US REP HAD REPORTED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS AS A SINGLE TANK ARMY IN RETURN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 US SOLDIERS AS INDIVIDUALS. HAD US AUTHORITIES FOUND ANY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, WHICH WAS A MOST IMPORTANT ONE TO THE SOVIETS?

46. US REP SAID US REPS HAD REPORTED SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS MATTER ACCURATELY TO US AUTHORITIES. HE WISHED TO REPEAT TO TARASOV WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER. THE SOVIET DESCRIPTION OF THE US POSITION ON US REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN AN OVERCHARACTERIZATION. THE US HAD RESERVED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT IT WOULD TAKE US WITHDRAWALS AS INDIVIDUALS AND TO WHAT EXTENT IN UNITS. THE US MAINTAINED THAT RESERVATION. BUT THIS DID NOT PRECLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME PERSONNEL IN UNITS. AS FAR AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY WAS CONCERNED, WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO FEEL THAT IT WAS JUSTIFIED FOR THE WEST TO ASK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN VIEW OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REDUCTIONS OFFERED BY THE WEST AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES.

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47. SHUSTOV SAID THE SOVIETS WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO REDUCE IN A SECOND AGREEMENT. THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION.

48. US REPS SAID THEY HAD ALSO REPORTED SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS MATTER ALSO TO THEIR AUTHORITIES. THEY HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR THE VIEWS OF THEIR AUTHORITIES DURING THE PRESENT CONVERSATION THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD AGREE TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING AND WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY BEFORE EXPECTING THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON THEIR REDUCTIONS.

49. THE DISCUSSION CONCLUDED AT THIS POINT.

50. REPORT TO AD HOC GROUP

ON OCTOBER 6, US REP REPORTED TO THE AD HOC GROUP ALONG THE LINES OF THE SUMMARY ABOVE, OMITTING THE COMMENT ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO DRAFT IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA. 6, THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA. 4 REGARDING MOVES THE EAST COULD TAKE TO INCREASE WESTERN CONFIDENCE, AND THE CONCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN PARA. 8. RESOR

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